Abstract When investigators are faced with a target system, they want to find sensitive information such as userID and password. Unfortunately, sensitive information can not be found on the hard drive in most cases. Consequently, sensitive information needs to be gathered from physical memory. In our research, we have found lots of sensitive information from physical memory by different techniques. Besides userID and password, we also have found QQ -chat logs that never have been referred in other papers.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to RFC 3227 [1] (Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving), which is well-known standard of evidence collect ion, there is a rule for collecting the volatile informat ion since such volatile information has a different order of volatility. Order of volatility fro m RFC 3227 is as follo ws: Registers, cache; Routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics, memo ry; Temporary file systems; Disk; Remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in question; Physical configuration, network topology; Archival med ia. We could see that the first item of vo latile data that should be collected on a live system is the contents of physical memo ry, co mmonly referred to as RAM.
Co mpared with other branches of dig ital forensics, memo ry forensics is still at an infancy stage. It aims at physical memo ry. Memo ry fo rensics is not an easy task, because we must collect evidence fro m a live system. As a result, we need to keep Locard Exchange Principle [2] in mind. It means it is impossible to take a forensically sound snapshot of the memory system being observed without altering it. When an investigator interacts with a live system, changes will occur to that system as programs are executed and data is copied fro m the system. These changes might be transient (process memory, network connections) or permanent (log files, Registry entries) [3] .
Sensitive informat ion, which is important for fo rensics investigators, also has volatility. If we want to gain sensitive information, we have to collect physical memo ry firstly. Collecting the contents of physical memo ry on a live system is not easy. It should maintain as small a footprint as possible on the system. There are several ways have been identified. Each of them has its own advantages and drawbacks and none is suitable for all cases.
physical memory through a dedicated communication port by means of a physical device (e.g., a PCI card). This would allow an investigator to retrieve the volatile memo ry fro m the system without introducing any new code or relying on potentially untrustworthy code to perform the ext raction. In February 2004, Brian and Joe [4] presented the concept for a hardware expansion card dubbed Tribble that could be used to retrieve the contents of physical memory to an external storage device. The authors also stated that they had built a proof-of-concept Tribble device, designed as a PCI expansion card that could be plugged into a PC bus. Other hardware devices are availab le that allow you to capture the contents of physical memo ry and are largely intended for debugging hardware systems. These devices may also be used for forensics. Hardware devices are easily accessible and have no impact on the live system. Using hardware have new or additional program to be loaded into memo ry. But the hardware has to be installed prior to the incident. Moreover it is not widely availab le on the general market today.
FireWire (a.k.a IEEE 1394) bus supports direct memo ry access, meaning it can access system memory without having to go through the CPU. Memory mapping is performed in hardware without going through the host operating system, allo wing for high-speed, low latency data transfers. This technique requires investigators have a controller device that contains the appropriate software and is capable of writing a co mmand into a specific area hardware devices, fire wire bus also has the ease of use and the null impact on the system. And many systems available today have FireWire /IEEE 1394 interfaces built right into the motherboards. Also, code has been released for direct ly accessing physical memo ry on Linu x and Mac OS systems [3] . Ho wever, Arne Vidstro m has pointed out some technical issues that fire wire bus presents problems with a region of the memory called Upper Memory Area (UMA) [5] . Furthermo re, in some cases this method causes hardware to malfunction, even Blue Screens of Death on some target Windows systems.
Data Du mper (DD) is a co mmon used tool for acquiring an image of physical memo ry fro m Unix. DD has long been considered a standard for producing forensic images, and most major forensic imaging/ acquisition tools as well as analysis tools support the dd format. It is able to co llect the contents of physical memo ry by accessing the \Device\PhysicalMemory object fro m user mode. The modified version of DD that runs on Windows systems and can be used to dump the contents of physical memory fro m Windows 2000 and XP systems is available within the windows forensic tools images developed by Garner [6] . DD might be the best method for retrieving the contents of physical memo ry. It does not require rebooting the system or restrict how and to where the contents of physical memo ry are written. Further, tools have been developed and made freely available to parse the contents of these RAM du mps to extract informat ion about processes, network connections, etc. But it also has some drawbacks. Memory collection can last a long t ime (say several hours). As it is a user space solution, an attacker can hook several places in order to tamper with collected data. \Device\ device is not available any more fro m user space since Windows 2003 SP1.
Some v irtualization products such as VMware [7] , allo w the creation of pseudo-networks utilizing the hardware of a single system. This technique allows investigators to create a snapshot of the target system and VM ware session is quick, easy, and min imizes the mpact on the system. The whole system activity is frozen during acquisition. Thus, the acquired data is fully consistent. However, virtualizat ion technologies are not widely used in systems.
which has demonstrated proof of concept by acquiring memo ry fro m W indows 2000 operating systems. This idea is to inject an independent, acquisition specific OS into the potentially subverted host OS kernel, snatching s fidelity, also has many limitations. For examp le, loader components for the alternative OS have a significant impact on the existing OS memory; the alternative OS has to support existing hardware on the target; etc. Besides the above techniques, there are other methods to collect physical memory. Our research is focused on opening RAM directly, crash dump, pagefile and hibernation. By these methods, we have found a lot of sensitive informat ion.
II. GATHERING SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM RAM DIRECTLY
There are some tools can provide access to physical
. WinHex is in its core a universal hexadecimal ed itor, particularly helpfu l in the realm of computer forensics, data recovery, low-level data processing, and IT security. RAM can be opened directly by W inHex. It is a very simp le way to collect and analyze RAM. After opening RAM, some information of physical memory is also given. Although using this tool can make RAM change, lots of sensitive informat ion can be found. For examp le, in our research we have found the process of a user changing his password. In Fig. 1 , we can see that the web site which the user yier eans the old means repeating the new password to make sure of password changing. ther examp le. We started QQ.exe, and logged in with three QQ numbers: 61056500, 292925211 and 348486909. Then we chatted with QQusual. After closing all of the QQ processes, we opened RAM by WinHex. We se found all of QQ-nu mbers that had logged in this system (Fig. 2) . And then we searched one of the nu mbers -and even th According to Locard exchange principle, opening RAM direct ly can change RAM. But it is very easy for investigators to approach physical memory.
III. GATHERING SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM CRASH DUMP FILE
A crash dump can be the result of instability on the system. In most cases it manifests itself as an infamous Blue Screen of Death. In this way we can obtain a pristine, untainted copy of the content of RAM fro m a system state is fro zen and the contents of RAM are swapped or copied to the disk. This preserves the state of the system and ensures that no alterations are made to the system, beginning at the time the crash dump was init iated.
According to MS KnowledgeBase (KB) art icle Q254649 [10] , there are three types of crash dump: small looking for is the complete crash dump because it contains the complete contents of RAM.
MS KB article Q244139 [11] informat ion such as structure of DUMP_HEA DER, physical memory description, version of the operating system, kernel base and unloaded modules.
In our research, we have used other tools to run strings searching on MEMORY.DMP. We opened Fro m Fig. 6 , we can see all of bullet in board systems that have been logged in by users of this computer and some contents of them. We also used WinHex to perfo rm a string searching on discovered username and password of E-Mail. This is an E- The crash dump solution is perhaps the only technically accurate method for creating an image of the contents of RAM. However, this method is not perfect. Windows systems do not generate full crash dumps by default (Table I ). The registry setting requires a reboot to be taken into account. It must have been set prior to the incident. The crash dump process will still create a file equal in size to physical memory on the hard drive. To do so, as stated in KB article Q274598 [14] , the pagefile must be configured to be equal to at least the size of physical memo ry p lus 1 M B. Furthermore, given pagefile limits, the ma ximu m du mp file size is 2GB. No co mp lete dump can be obtained on a system with mo re than 2GB of physical memory [15] . The pagefile is not a memory dump file. However, in order to recover as many memo ry pages as possible, it would be valuable to have access to the pagefile fo r a Windows based system. Then the physical me mory and pagefile data should be merged into a single set of data.
V. GATHERING SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM HIBERNAT ION FILE
Hibernation means the whole system state is backed up to hard drive and the system is frozen for a infinite amount of time without any power source. The Power Manager saves the compressed contents of physical memo ry to a file called Hiberfil.sys in the root directory of the system vo lu me. Hiberfil.sys is created when the system hibernates for the first time. This file is large enough to hold the uncompressed contents of physical memo ry, but co mpression is used to minimize disk I/O and to improve resume -fro m-hibernation performance. During the boot process, if a valid Hiberfil.sys into physical memo ry and transfer control to code within the kernel that handles resuming system operation after h ibernation.
In our research, we also used WinHex copy hiberfil.sys and If h ibernation has previously been used on the target system, this memory collection method could prove to be a useful idea. Analy zing the contents of a hibernation file could give us a clue as to what was happening on the system at some point in the past. But if the last hibernation occurred long time ago, the hibernation file is significantly out of date. Further, the hibernation file is using an undocumented, Microsoft proprietary file format, including proprietary co mpression. Moreover, the hibernation file is most often found on laptop systems. VI.
CONCLUSIONS
By now it should be clear that we have several options for collecting physical memory fro m a live system. Each of them has its own advantages and limitations. In order to recover as much sensitive informat ion as possible, it is better to merge crash du mp and pagefile to collect physical memory. Ho wever, there is much more volat ile informat ion can be gathered from physical memo ry, such as information of running processes. So we can make a deeper research in physical memory relevant fields in farther work.
